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Consume or Invest: 
What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize? 
William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman1 
Abstract 
In the regulatory state, agency leaders face a fundamental choice:  
should they “consume” or should they “invest?”  “Consume” means 
launching high profile cases and rule-making.  “Invest” means developing 
and nurturing the necessary infrastructure for the agency to handle whatever 
the future may bring.  The former brings headlines, while the latter will be 
completely ignored.  Unsurprisingly, consumption is routinely prioritized, 
and investment is deferred, downgraded, or overlooked entirely.  This essay 
outlines the incentives for agency leadership to behave in this way and 
explores the resulting agency costs (pun intended).  The U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission’s health care portfolio provides a useful case study of how one 
agency managed and minimized these costs.  Our essay concludes with 
several proposals that should help encourage agency leadership to strike a 
better balance between consumption and investment. 
1 Kovacic is Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington 
University Law School and Non-executive Director, United Kingdom Competition and 
Markets Authority.  From 2006 to 2011, the author served as a member of the Federal 
Trade Commission and chaired the agency from March 2008 to March 2009.  Hyman is H. 
Ross and Helen Workman Chair in Law and Professor of Medicine, University of Illinois. 
From 2001-2004, he served as Special Counsel at the Federal Trade Commission.  The 
views expressed here are the authors’ alone. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705919 
2 Consume or Invest [19-Dec-15 
Consume or Invest: 
What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?  
 
“[P]art of public service is planting trees under whose shade you’ll 
never sit.”2   
I. Introduction 
In the management cliché hall of fame, the all-time winner is “pick 
the low-hanging fruit.”3  Of course, obtaining high-value results with a 
minimum of effort is excellent advice, at least as a starting point.  But, as a 
general principle, the message is extremely short-sighted.  Unless leaders 
plant trees, there will be neither shade nor fruit for future generations to 
enjoy.  
The conflict between picking and planting – between consuming and 
investing – is a policy perennial.  Good leaders know that any success they 
may achieve depends on the investment decisions made by their 
predecessors.  In like fashion, good leaders also know that the benefits of 
any investment they make will be captured by their successors.  
Agency leaders are not angels.4  They are human beings, who desire 
personal recognition and advancement.  Investment in institutional 
capability and capacity does not result in newspaper headlines, popular 
acclaim, or the offer of a high paying private-sector job.  Instead, it is the 
announcement of a “big” case or rulemaking that casts the agency and 
agency leadership in a positive light. 
If there is no turnover in agency leadership, this dynamic would not 
create a major problem: “when agency leadership does not change, the 
leaders capture the benefits (and bear the costs) of the outcomes in the cases 
                                                
2 Hillary Clinton Transcript, Building The ‘Growth and Fairness’ Economy, WALL ST. 
J., July 13, 2015, at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/07/13/hillary-clinton-transcript-
building-the-growth-and-fairness-economy/.  
3 Lucy Kinder, Office jargon: The worst culprits in management speak, THE (UK) 
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 27, 2015, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jobs/10393668/Office-jargon-The-worst-culprits-in-
management-speak.html.  
4 See The Federalist No. 51 (“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. 
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would 
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the 
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the 
primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of 
auxiliary precautions.”) 
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that they initiate.”5  But, agency leadership is never indefinite.  Indeed, in 
most of the administrative state, political appointees come and go quite 
frequently.6  A timely departure makes it possible for agency leadership to 
“‘outrun their mistakes,’ so that when blame-time arrives, the burden will 
fall on someone else.”7  In practice, this means that agency leaders have a 
significant incentive to launch big cases or rulemaking without being overly 
concerned about the agency’s capability and capacity to deliver the goods.8  
Stated more concretely, agency leaders will predictably and systematically 
slight investment and prioritize consumption.  I.B.G.-Y.B.G. (“I’ll be gone, 
you’ll be gone”) doesn’t apply only to Wall Street.9     
                                                
5 David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? 
Judging the FTC’s Critics, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2015) (hereinafter Can’t 
Anyone Here Play This Game?). 
6 PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN AND HOW IT CAN DO 
BETTER 316-317 (2014) (“A study of presidential appointees. . . found an overall median 
tenure of only 2.5 years; one quarter of them served more than 3.6 years while another 
quarter served for less than eighteen months.”) 
7 Id., quoting ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE 
MANAGERS 90 (1988). Anthony King and Ivor Crewe study the behavior of cabinet 
ministers and other senior officials in the United Kingdom, and reach the same conclusion: 
“[t]he sheer passage of time may also result in non-accountability.  By the time the 
Thatcher government’s exciting new personal pensions had been mis-sold on a vast scale, 
the relevant ministers and probably most of their senior officials had long since passed on.  
It would have been almost impossible to hold any of them to account. . . the relationship in 
British politics between, on the one hand, long-term success and failure and, on the other, 
personal triumph and disgrace is all but non-existent.  Most blunderers, however gross their 
blunders, go unpunished.”  ANTHONY KING & IVOR CREWE, THE BLUNDERS OF OUR 
GOVERNMENTS 354, 359 (2014).  
8 Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
165, 166 (2005) (“An agency head garners great attention by beginning ‘bold’ initiatives 
and suing big companies.  When the bill comes due for the hard work of turning initiatives 
into successful regulation and proving big cases in court, these agency heads are often gone 
from the public stage.  Their successors are left either to trim excessive proposals or even 
to default, with possible damage to agency reputation.  The departed agency heads, if 
anyone in the Washington establishment now cares about their views, can always blame 
failure on faulty implementation by their successors.”). 
9 Eric Dash, What’s Really Wrong with Wall Street Pay, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG, 
Sep. 18, 2009, at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/whats-really-wrong-with-
wall-street-pay/?_r=0 (“A major cause of the current crisis will most likely prove to be a 
mismatch of incentives for Wall Street traders.  If a mortgage trader made a big bet, he had 
the chance to land a big bonus if it paid off (and his boss did, too).  If, however, that bet 
didn’t pan out — and the trader lost a lot of money for the firm — he might receive no 
bonus at all.  On the contrary, he might get a princely severance package. 
But one thing seems pretty clear: That trader would not receive a “negative bonus.” In 
other words, he did not personally incur the cost of the trading blowup. Indeed, the open 
secret on Wall Street was that traders did not risk losing their own money — just the 
chance of receiving an enormous payout. 
Economists call this a moral hazard problem. In bankerspeak, it’s known as the 
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Building on our previous work,10 we show the importance of 
balancing consumption against investment.  We focus on the policy 
mismatches that arise when short-term political appointees lead 
governmental agencies with long-term policy needs – but our analysis also 
applies to private and non-profit firms. We also discuss measures that can 
serve to counteract inadequate attention to investment.  We use the health 
care program of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) since the mid-1970s 
to illustrate the importance of sustained investments in capability.  
Part II describes how investments in agency capability provide the 
necessary foundation on which an agency builds successful cases, rules, and 
other policy initiatives.  Part III examines the structural and political 
incentives that encourage agency leadership to systematically privilege 
consumption over investment.  Part IV provides a case study of the FTC’s 
health care portfolio, where investments in policy R&D have played a 
critical role in generating policy success. Part V identifies a few modest 
strategies that might encourage the prioritization of investment by agency 
leaders.  Part VI addresses objections that might be raised against a 
rebalancing of consumption and investment.  Part VII concludes.   
II. The Need for Investment 
In this essay, we focus on agencies similar to the FTC, but the 
framework we describe applies to many governmental agencies.  
Regulatory agencies, like the FTC, have a wide variety of policy 
                                                                                                                       
“I.B.G.-Y.B.G.” issue — as in “I’ll Be Gone and You’ll Be Gone” if the trade goes 
south.”) 
The same dynamic has been noted in international development projects: “[w]hen 
those who design development projects and get them approved by relevant authorities, 
move on, get promoted, and are not held accountable for results, is that not a case of you'll 
be gone and I'll be gone? If you are not going to be held accountable for implementation 
and results you don't have to worry about whether or not the project will produce results 
under real world conditions. You can cut and paste global best practice on a technical issue 
into projects to be implemented in vastly different environments. Job done. When 
implementation challenges inevitably arise and hold things up, well, that is somebody else's 
problem. For the design team it is a case of 'I'll be gone and you'll be gone.”  Sina 
Odugbemi, I’ll Be Gone and You’ll Be Gone, World Bank Blog, Sep. 23, 2009, at 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/ill-be-gone-and-youll-be-gone.    
10 Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 5; David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why 
Who Does What Matters: Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO WASH. 
L. REV. 1446 (2014) (hereinafter Agency Performance); David A. Hyman & William, E. 
Kovacic, Competition Agencies with Complex Policy Portfolios: Divide or Conquer? 
CONCURRENCES, No. 1-2013, at 9 (hereinafter Divide or Conquer); David A. Hyman & 
William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of Competition 
Law, 81 FORD. L. REV. 2163 (2013); William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Competition 
Agency Design: What’s on the Menu? 8 EUR. COMP. J. 527 (2012).  
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instruments at their disposal.11  An agency can prosecute cases, promulgate 
rules, conduct studies, issue reports, convene public consultations, issue 
guidelines, or have agency personnel give speeches.  To apply these tools 
effectively, the agency must do three things well: it must understand the 
behavior it observes; it must decide whether the behavior is sufficiently 
problematic to justify intervention; and, it must then choose among the 
various alternative solutions.  The expert performance of these three tasks –
requires substantial institutional capability and capacity. Developing that 
capability and capacity requires an agency to perform effectively in five 
distinct investment domains.12   
The first investment domain requires the agency to hire skilled 
professionals and other personnel, and organize them into teams.  These 
teams can be organized in a variety of ways. For example, the FTC has 
separate Bureaus for Competition, Consumer Protection, and Economics. 
The Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection are 
staffed by lawyers; the Bureau of Economics is staffed by economists.13  As 
we have noted elsewhere, “the government is already thickly planted with 
bureaus, agencies, and inter-agency working groups, departments and 
commissions” – and each has its own internal organization designed to 
effectuate the statutory mission.14 
Whatever organizational configuration is chosen, a successful 
operating unit will contain teams with strong analytical skills and deep 
expertise in the relevant subject matter.15   Good teams prosper by reason of 
their intellectual acumen and intuition, honed by repeated study of specific 
                                                
11 For a discussion of how effective policy making often requires a wide range of 
instruments, see More than Law Enforcement: The FTC’s Many Tools – A Conversation 
with Tim Muris and Bob Pitofsky, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (2005) (hereinafter 
Muris/Pitofsky Conversation).   
12 The importance of these factors is examined in Hyman & Kovacic, Agency 
Performance, supra note 7, at 1474-75; William E. Kovacic, The Digital Broadband 
Migration and the Federal Trade Commission: Building the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. 1, 7 (2010); see also 
King & Crewe, supra note 7, at 382-84 (identifying “skills shortages” as important cause of 
failure of government programs”). 
13 See Hyman & Kovacic, Divide or Conquer, supra note 10.  See also Luke Froeb, 
Paul Pautler & Lars Hendrik Roeller, The Economics of Organizing Economists, 76 
ANTITRUST L. J. 569 (2009) (describing the impact of the FTC relying on multi-
disciplinary teams of lawyers and economists v. having lawyers and economists organized 
into separate bureaus).   
14 Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 10.  See also Jennifer Nou, 
Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 Harv. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, 2015)   
15 See William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission at 100: Into our 2nd 
Century 46-49 (Jan. 2009) (importance of talented personnel to FTC performance), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt.    
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problems. For example, the FTC economists and lawyers who review 
mergers in the pharmaceutical industry have analyzed dozens of 
transactions over the past few decades.16  They have a sophisticated 
understanding of individual firms, drug research pipelines, and industry 
trends. The personnel on the groups changes over time, yet the FTC 
pharmaceutical mergers team has sustained a good mix of experienced 
managers and case handlers and newer employees who learn from 
longstanding team members. 
Second, the agency must develop an administrative infrastructure 
(both personnel and physical facilities) to support substantive projects.  A 
major component of the FTC’s consumer protection work consists of 
prosecuting fraudulent schemes involving health care products and 
services.17  These and other anti-fraud initiatives have benefitted immensely 
from investments the FTC made in the 1990s to build an electronic data 
base (Consumer Sentinel) that collects and analyzes complaints about 
alleged misconduct.18  By amassing complaints received by the FTC and a 
variety of governmental and non-governmental partners, Consumer Sentinel 
enables the FTC’s consumer protection specialists to identify fraudulent 
scams quickly and assemble the evidence necessary to initiate litigation.19  
Thus, the investment in Consumer Sentinel made it much easier for the FTC 
to detect and remedy serious fraud on a real-time basis.20   
The FTC has made similar investments in mobile telephony.21  
                                                
16 Markus H. Meier, Bradley S. Albert & Saralisa Brau, Overview of FTC Antitrust 
Actions in Pharmaceutical Services and Products 26-64 (discussing FTC pharmaceutical 
mergers program), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-
policy-guidance/rxupdate.pdf.  
17 See, e.g., FTC Press Release, FTC, All 50 States and D.C. Charge Four Cancer 
Charities With Bilking Over $187 Million from Consumers (May 19, 2015), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-all-50-states-dc-charge-four-
cancer-charities-bilking-over; FTC Press Release, No Silver Lining for Marketers of Bogus 
Supplement; Federal Agencies Crack Down on Health Fraud (June 19, 2003), available at 
http://ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2003/06/no-silver-lining-marketers-bogus-
supplement-federal-agencies; FTC Press Release, Company Touting Unproven Cancer 
Treatment Agrees to Settle FTC Charges (July 24, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/07/company-touting-unproven-cancer-
treatment-agrees-settle-ftc. 
18 See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 11, at 789-91 (discussing creation and 
operation of Consumer Sentinel). 
19 FTC, Consumer Sentinel Network (describing functions of Consumer Sentinel 
Network), available at http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/consumer-sentinel-network. 
20 See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 11, at 796-97 (describing impact of 
Consumer Sentinel). 
21 On the FTC’s programs in this area, see FTC, Staff Report, Paper, Plastic … or 
Mobile? An FTC Workshop on Mobile Payments (Mar. 2013), available at 
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Communications technology is one of the most dynamic areas of 
commerce, and the FTC has to continuously invest in order to keep up.  In 
response, the FTC has hired technologists with expertise in the relevant 
technical disciplines and established an internal “mobile laboratory” to 
detect fraud in the use of mobile telephones.22       
A third key ingredient of agency capability is the depth and currency 
of its knowledge about the sectors and practices that are subject to the 
agency’s scrutiny.  As suggested above, one element of this knowledge base 
is the accumulated experience of agency analysts in dealing with specific 
industries and commercial practices. Another important source of an 
agency’s knowledge consists of investments that are the public policy 
equivalent of the research and development expenditures that a private 
company makes to create new or improve existing products.23   
Policy R&D24 can take various forms, including empirical studies of 
individual sectors or commercial phenomena, legal research concerning the 
legal predicates for future cases, hearings and public consultations, and 
retrospective assessments of completed agency initiatives.25 These measures 
have a common purpose – to improve the agency’s ability to identify areas 
of needed intervention; devise useful remedies; and give advice to 
legislators and other government agencies. The urgency to make these 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/paper-plastic-or-mobile-ftc-workshop-mobile-payments; FTC, 
Staff Report, Mobile Privacy Disclosures – Building Trust Through Transparency (Feb. 
2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-
privacu-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staff-
report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf. 
22 See FTC, Division of Litigation, Technology & Analysis (describing FTC’s 
Mobile/Internet Lab), available at http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-
consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-litigation-technology; Joel Schectman, Q&A 
David Vladeck, Former Director of FTC Consumer Unit, Risk & Compliance Journal, 
Wall St. J., Jan, 22, 2014 (“[W]e did not have the technologists on staff at the time and to 
do highly technical cases of the kind we did during my [Vladeck’s] tenure, and doing still 
today, you need substantial forensic work.  One of the things we did was bring in 
technologists to have on staff.  We set up a laboratory to do forensic work on mobile 
devices.  You need to have people who can view evidence captures on mobile devices and 
really understand the ecosystem behind the screen.  I think we were the first civil law 
enforcement agency anywhere that had a fully functioning lab for mobile devices.”). 
23 Kovacic, supra note 15, at 91-109 (describing FTC investments that increase the 
agency’s knowledge base). 
24  This phrase originated in Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade 
Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUMBIA BUS. 
L. REV. 359. 
25 See Muris/Pitofsky Dialogue, supra note 11, at 774-76 (discussing FTC policy R&D 
tools); William E. Kovacic, Measuring What Matters: The Federal Trade Commission and 
Investments in Competition Policy Research and Development, 72 Antitrust L.J. 861 (2005) 
(same); Kovacic, supra note 15, at 91-109 (same). 
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investments is especially great in sectors, such as health care, that feature 
high levels of technological and organizational dynamism.26  Congress gave 
the FTC a diverse portfolio of policy R&D tools,27 and their application has 
figured prominently in the agency’s health care programs.     
A fourth form of investment that fosters program success is the 
development of internal procedures that enable the agency to make 
intelligent decisions about how to deploy its limited resources   There are 
many ways that an agency can structure its internal decision making 
process.28  Good agency practice includes continuing efforts to improve 
these processes to test evidence rigorously and to counteract behavioral 
phenomena, such as confirmation bias, that might otherwise cause the 
agency to slight theories or facts that dictate a reassessment of its views.29   
Finally, an agency must “play well with others.”  In many fields of 
regulation, policy making duties are shared by a multiplicity of public 
bodies within individual jurisdictions and across nations.30  In a world of 
increasing policymaking multiplicity and fragmentation, the attainment of 
good regulatory solutions requires interagency and inter-jurisdictional 
engagement.  Some forms of engagement take place through formal 
mechanisms such as memoranda of understanding between two or more 
agencies, or a network that brings together multiple agencies within a single 
jurisdiction or across jurisdictions.31  Others can be highly informal, such as 
a custom of senior managers or case handlers from different agencies 
meeting regularly to discuss matters of common concern.  These formal and 
informal means of coordination and cooperation do not happen without 
investment – although investment does not guarantee that other agencies 
                                                
26 William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in High-Tech Industries: Improving the Federal 
Antitrust Joint Venture, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1102-03 (2012). 
27 Foremost among these are provisions that authorize the FTC to collect information 
on industrial conditions and specific practices outside the context of law enforcement and 
to publish studies.  15 U.S.C. ¶¶ 46, 49.  Their significance is discussed in William E. 
Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission as Convenor: Developing Regulatory Policy 
without Litigation or Rulemaking, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 17, 19 (2015).  
28 See William E. Kovacic et al., Merger Control Procedures and Institutions: A 
Comparison of EU and US Practice, 59 Antitrust Bull. 55 (2014) (comparing European 
Union and U.S. merger control processes). 
29 James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and Regulatory 
Agency Decisionmaking, 41 J. Reg. Econ. 41 (2011). 
30 Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 10, at 1480-81. 
31 See Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, The International Competition 
Network: Its Past, Current, and Future Role, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 274 (2011) (describing 
development of formal networks that bring together competition agency officials to discuss 
matters of common concern); Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 11, at 795 
(describing FTC agreements with foreign governments to cooperate on consumer 
protection matters) 
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will decide to make nice.32    
An agency that does all of these things increases the chances of 
attaining policy success.  The requisite investments will seldom happen by 
accident. Rather, each generation of agency leadership must make a 
commitment to build institutional capability and capacity, and continuously 
examine whether it is investing enough, and in the right things.  As we 
discuss more fully below, these investments are the foundation on which 
good outcomes depend. 
III. The Sirens of Consumption 
If investment is so important, why do we think that agency 
leadership routinely defers, downgrades, or overlooks it?33  The explanation 
is simple: the Sirens of consumption are hard to resist.34  What agency 
leader can resist the temptation of being the one to announce an attention-
grabbing intervention, such as the initiation of a case against a major 
industry player, or the launch of a new rule-making project?  The resulting 
press conference and favorable academic commentary provide ready-made 
opportunities for credit-claiming.  Professional reputations and post-public 
service employment opportunities will rise or fall depending on the volume 
of an agency’s activity.35  Simply stated, the initiation of cases and rule-
                                                
32  There have been periodic bitter disputes between the FTC and DOJ over 
“clearance” (i.e., which agency should handle certain types of cases; the substantive 
content of a report on Section 2 of the Sherman Act; and the DOJ’s recommendation 
against the granting of certiorari in Schering-Plough, an early FTC reverse payment case.  
One of us (Kovacic) ruefully noted in an interview that despite continuous investment, “we 
have an archipelago of policy-makers, with very inadequate ferry service between the 
islands. . . In too many instances, when you go to visit those islands, the inhabitants come 
out with sticks and torches and try to chase you away.”  Jonathan B. Baker, Turning on 
Itself, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sep. 14, 2008, at 
https://newrepublic.com/article/63428/turning-itself.   
33 See Kovacic, supra note 12, at 7; Muris, supra note 8. 
34  William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good 
Performance? 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 923 (2009) (“The perceived imperative to 
create new cases can create a serious mismatch between commitments and capabilities, as 
the sirens of credit claiming beckon today’s manager to overlook the costs that improvident 
case selection might impose on the agency in the future, well after the incumbent manager 
has departed.”) 
35 Consumption increases post-public service employment opportunities in two ways.  
First, consumption enhances reputation directly.  And, those responsible for creating a 
regulatory labyrinth are ideally situated to guide affected firms through the maze – and be 
handsomely compensated for doing so.  In nautical terms, having created underwater 
obstacles at the entry to the harbor, the former regulator then acts as the pilot who can bring 
ships safely to shore.  See Hyman & Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game?, supra 
note 5 (discussing private sector demand for former regulators who played a role in 
creating regulatory mechanisms).    
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making projects are the readily observable events by which agency 
leadership is typically judged.36   
Worse still, the temporal disconnect between launches and 
(sometimes crash) landings means that agency leadership does not bear the 
full cost of launching cases and rule-making that should never have been 
initiated.  The same dynamic applies to cases and rule-making that should 
have been initiated, but failed because there was insufficient capability and 
capacity to handle the matter in question.  Indeed, agency leadership may 
not bear any of the costs, if they are able to blame their successors for the 
(usually unspecified) mistakes that supposedly caused a bad outcome. 37   
Politics can also encourage excessive and unwise consumption.  
When the price of gasoline rose sharply in the early-1970s, Congress 
demanded that the FTC take action to protect independent refiners from 
alleged overreaching by large, vertically integrated petroleum companies.38  
The FTC responded in 1973 by filing In re Exxon, a “shared 
monopolization” case seeking the vertical disintegration of the eight largest 
petroleum refiners in the United States.39 The sprawling case was 
unmanageable from the start, and it fast became seen by FTC staff as a 
professional chain gang where morale and careers went to die.40  In 1981, 
                                                
36 Kovacic, supra note 12, at 10-11. See also William E. Kovacic, The Modern 
Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 377, 404-05, 408-10 
(2004) (describing and criticizing tendency of commentators to use prosecution of cases as 
main measure of competition agency quality); King & Crewe, supra note 7, at 333-45 
(noting “hyperactivism” of ministers in U.K.).  Unsurprisingly, the preeminent annual 
ranking of competition agencies focuses chiefly on the prosecution of cases.  Global 
Competition Review, 2015 Rating Enforcement – The Annual Ranking of the World’s 
Leading Competition Authorities (2015).  
37 William E. Kovacic, Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: 
Two Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases, 12 
RES. L. & ECON. 173, 189 (1989) (“[A] short-term perspective may incline the manager to 
launch headline-grabbing initiatives with inadequate regard for the matter’s underlying 
merits or the ultimate cost to the agency, in resources and reputation, in litigating the case.  
If the case goes badly, the manager responsible for the take-off rarely is held to account for 
the crash landing.  He can hope the passage of time will dim memories of his involvement, 
he can blame intervening agents for their poor execution of his good idea, or he can shrug 
his shoulders and say he was making the best of the fundamentally bad situation that 
policymakers encounter in the nation’s capital.”)  See also Muris, supra note 8.   
38 William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight 
of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L. REV. 587, 637-39 (1982).   
39 In re Exxon Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)  ¶ 20,388 
(Dkt. No. 8934, July 17, 1973), complaint dismissed, 98 F.T.C. 453 (1981).  The run-up to 
the case and the political pressure that inspired it are examined in Timothy J. Muris & Bilal 
K. Sayyed, The Long Shadow of Standard Oil: Policy, Petroleum and Politics at the 
Federal Trade Commission, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 859-64 (2011).  
40 Edward Cowan, Attorneys Quit F.T.C. Oil Case, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1978, at D-1. 
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after eight years of pre-trial discovery, the Commission dismissed the 
case.41   The case consumed massive resources and inflicted lasting harm on 
the FTC’s reputation.42 
The same pattern recurred thirty years later, albeit with a different 
outcome.  The price of gasoline spiked repeatedly during 2000-2008, and 
members of Congress used a variety of techniques to induce the FTC to take 
action.43  In one instance, two members of the Senate imposed a “hold” on 
the nomination of Deborah Majoras to be the agency’s chair.44  The hold 
was released only after the Commission in May 2004 opened an 
investigation to study the decision of Chevron to close a refinery in 
Bakersfield, California.45   
Congress held multiple hearings, during which legislators berated 
agency leaders for allowing gasoline prices to rise.  Perhaps the most 
striking of these legislative show trials was the appearance of Chairman 
Majoras in May, 2006 before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science 
& Transportation to defend an FTC report on the impact of Hurricane 
Katrina and Hurricane Rita on petroleum product prices.46  The report found 
no evidence of supplier collusion, and instead concluded that the observed 
price spikes were the inevitable result of national disasters that severely 
disrupted refining and transport operations.  Despite demagogic and 
frequently ad hominem interrogation, Majoras held firm.  She refused to 
commit the agency to use its antitrust law enforcement powers in a futile, 
expensive attempt to tame forces entirely beyond the agency’s control.     
To be sure, the problem is not unique to gasoline.  Elected officials 
routinely demand that regulators “do something” when the price of heating 
                                                
41 Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453, 459 (1981). 
42 William E. Kovacic, Standard Oil Co. v. United States and Its Influence on the 
Conception of Competition Policy, 2012 COMP. L.J. 89 (discussing FTC’s prosecution of 
petroleum industry shared monopolization case and its long-term effects on the agency).  
Kovacic spent two years working on the Exxon case, and saw first-hand the corrosive 
effects of requiring staff to work on a matter that all involved knew to be doomed. 
43 This episode is recounted in Muris & Sayyed, supra note 39, at 903-07. 
44 One of us (Kovacic) was the FTC’s General Counsel at this time and observed the 
congressional moves to delay consideration of the Majoras nomination. 
45 The opening and closing of the FTC inquiry are described in FTC Press Release, 
FTC Closes its Investigation of Shell Oils Decision to Close Bakersfield, California, 
Refinery (May 25, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/05/ftc-closes-its-investigation-shell-oils-decision-close.  
46 Federal Trade Commission Investigation of Gasoline Price Manipulation and Post-
Katrina Price Gasoline Increases: A Commission Report to Congress (May 22, 2006), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-investigation-gasoline-price-manipulation-and-post-katreina-gasoline-
price/060518publicgasolinepriceinvestigationreportfinal.pdf.  
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oil, natural gas, electricity, and other important consumer products rises 
dramatically.  Rather than attribute a price increase to causes beyond the 
control of the product’s suppliers, such as a sudden boost in input costs, 
elected officials typically insist that wrongful supplier behavior (e.g., 
collusion, fraud, price-gouging) accounts for the unwanted event.  In these 
circumstances, the regulator will face intense pressure to use its powers to 
address the problem.  Intervention (in the form of an investigation or case) 
is faster and easier than attempting to educate legislators and cabinet 
officials that the root cause of the market shock lies elsewhere – and the 
intervention may actually be counter-productive.47  Indeed, the failure to 
intervene may be viewed by members of Congress as dereliction of duty.  
Caving in to the pressure to intervene will provide momentary relief to 
agency leadership, but at a significant long-term institutional cost.  Filing 
the Exxon case got Congress off of the FTC’s back, but it inflicted painful 
long-term harm.  And, by the time the bill comes due, those who were 
responsible for the initial decision to intervene will be long gone – and will 
find it easy to blame their successors if anyone bothers to ask.48  
A third factor encouraging consumption is a miscalculation of the 
likely difficulty, costs, and risks of the contemplated intervention.  The 
decision to launch a case should rest upon a clear-headed understanding of 
how hard it will be to gather relevant evidence; the legal foundations of the 
case; the type and quality of personnel required for effective 
implementation; and the risks to the agency of proceeding.  Each of these 
should be evaluated within the context of the agency’s overall portfolio of 
existing commitments.  If an agency does not undertake this analysis, 
leadership will tend to initiate matters without a realistic view of what it 
                                                
47 Price-gouging legislation provides a particularly clear example.  See Michael A. 
Sallinger, Give Your Cabdriver a Fat Tip!, Wall St. J. June 24, 2006, at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115110485824489519.  (“If the public were to ask my 
advice on the wisdom of price gouging legislation, however, I would counsel against it. 
When disasters like Katrina and Rita occur, prices must go up.  The difficulty is that 
without knowing the details of a disaster, it is impossible to specify in advance how much 
prices need to rise.  As result, price-gouging legislation -- particularly if penalties are 
severe and enforcement is aggressive -- will pose two distinct risks.  One is that prices will 
not rise to market-clearing levels and gas stations will run out of gasoline.  As unpleasant 
as high-priced gasoline is, running out will be even worse.  The other is that gas stations 
will shut down rather than risk an allegation of price gouging.”)  See also Steven Mufson, 
Congress Tells FTC to Define Price Gouging, Wash. Post, May 6, 2006 (“‘Many 
economists cringe when they hear politicians talk about price gouging,’ said N. Gregory 
Mankiw, an economics professor at Harvard University and former chairman of President 
Bush's Council of Economic Advisers. ‘To economists, the price system is central to how 
market economies allocate resources.  Sometimes prices need to rise to balance supply and 
demand, even if that outcome is politically unpopular.’”)  
48 See supra note 37.   
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will take to complete them successfully.   
The IBM case provides a striking example of the problem.  The case 
was launched by the Department of Justice (DOJ), on the final day of 
Lyndon Johnson’s presidency in January 1969.49  Among other relief, DOJ 
sought to break IBM into four or more computer companies.50  It quickly 
became apparent that the case was in trouble.51  DOJ had vastly 
underestimated the doctrinal, evidentiary, and administrative difficulties of 
seeking to take apart what was, perhaps, the paramount exemplar of 
American technological progress in the post-World War II era.52 Nor did 
DOJ anticipate the scope and ferocity of defense that IBM and its external 
advisors would mount to oppose the government.  IBM’s ensemble of 
exceptional trial lawyers and expert economists overwhelmed a DOJ 
prosecution team afflicted with disorganization and rapid turnover in 
personnel.53  In 1982 DOJ abandoned the case,54 whose duration had 
“spanned the terms of five Presidents, nine Attorney Generals, and seven 
Assistant Attorney Generals.”55 The trial consumed 700 calendar days, 
generated a transcript of over 104,000 pages, and featured 17,000 exhibits.56 
In Robert Bork’s phrase, the IBM case was “the Antitrust Division’s 
                                                
49 United States v. IBM Corp., [1961-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
45,069 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1969) (complaint alleging monopolization and attempted 
monopolization). 
50 See FRANK FISHER ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED – ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS AND U.S. V. IBM 353-68 (1983) (reprinting DOJ’s original complaint and 
amended complaint against IBM). 
51 Donald Baker, who served as DOJ’s Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust from 
1976 to 1977, wrote that “[b]y even the mid-1970s, it was clear that the [IBM] case was a 
relic.”  Donald Baker, Government Enforcement of Section Two, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
898, 8190 (1986) (hereinafter Section Two) 
52 The history of the IBM case and DOJ’s missteps in the formulation and litigation of 
the matter are recounted in John E. Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument to 
Arrogance, 68 Antitrust L.J. 145 (2000).  We also based the statements in this paragraph on 
interviews that Kovacic conducted with Edwin Zimmerman, a senior official at DOJ at the 
time of the filing of the IBM case, and Frederic M. Scherer, who served as DOJ’s chief 
economic expert on the case. 
53 IBM’s successful defense against the DOJ case is reviewed in JAMES STEWART, THE 
PARTNERS 53-113 (1983).  Among the stars of the IBM defense team was David Boies, a 
young partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore.  Years later Boies headed the litigation trial 
team in DOJ’s successful prosecution in the late 1990s of Microsoft for illegal 
monopolization of the market for computer operating systems.   
54 In re International Business Machs. Corp., 687 F.2d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(ordering the issue of a writ of mandamus directing district court to dismiss complaint in 
accordance with stipulation of the parties). 
55 Baker, Section Two, supra note 51, at 899 n. 13. 
56 Post-Mortem on IBM Case Provides Forum for Conflicting Perspectives, 42 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 310-11 (1982). 
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Vietnam.”57  These examples make it clear that an agency’s failure to think 
carefully in advance about its capability to deliver on a single major case 
can be devastating.   
What happens when agency leadership ignores these points, and 
chases the Sirens of consumption?  The FTC in the 1970s provides a clear 
case study of what can go wrong. As we noted in an earlier article, “it is one 
thing to launch a single bet-the-agency case and entirely another to launch a 
half-dozen of those cases and an equal number of significant rulemaking 
projects simultaneously—let alone staff each case and rulemaking project 
so as to maximize the likelihood of good outcomes across the entire 
portfolio.”58   
Despite the obvious risks, that is more or less what the FTC did in 
the 1970s.  Consider a partial list of the agency’s competition matters 
during this period: 
• Shared monopolization cases involving the country’s eight leading 
petroleum refiners (the Exxon case)59 and the four leading producers 
of ready-to-eat breakfast cereals;60  
• Cases alleging monopolization or attempted monopolization based 
on predatory pricing against leading producers in the bread, coffee, 
and reconstituted lemon juice sectors;61 
• A challenge to the long-standing practice of the nation’s leading 
soft-drink bottlers for using exclusive territories to distribute their 
products;62 
• A case alleging attempting monopolization in the chemicals sector 
by means of strategic announcements of capacity expansion;63 
                                                
57 This quotation appears in Baker, Section Two, supra note 51, at 899 n.13. 
58 Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 5 
59 Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C at 456-59 (complaint alleging agreement to monopolize and 
maintenance of a noncompetitive3 market structure). 
60 Kellogg Corp., 99 F.T.C. 8, 11-16 (1982) (complaint alleging maintenance of a 
highly concentrated, noncompetitive market structure and shared monopolization).. 
61 International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280, 284-85 (1984) (complaint alleging 
attempted monopolization in the bread sector); General Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 206-
08 (1984) (complaint alleging attempted monopolization in production and sale of instant 
coffee); Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C 669, 671-72 (1978) (complaint alleging monopolization and 
maintenance of a noncompetitive market structure in production and sale of reconstituted 
lemon juice), enforcement granted, 674 F.2d 498, 517 (6th Cir. 1982), modified, 102 F.T.C. 
1147 (1983). 
62 Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978), remanded for dismissal, 642 F2d. 1387 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). 
63 E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 654-55 (1980) (complaint alleging 
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• A case alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization 
against the world’s leading producer of plain-paper photocopiers;64 
• A case challenging illegal monopolization and attempting 
monopolization against one of the largest U.S. producers of citrus 
fruit;65 
• A case attacking the American Medical Association for imposing 
restrictions on advertising and marketing in the medical 
profession;66 
• A case designed to lead to the repudiation of the rule of United 
States v. Colgate which gave manufacturers protection from antitrust 
liability when unilaterally imposing resale price maintenance upon 
downstream firms;67 
• Two cases challenging the parallel, non-collusive adoption of 
facilitating practices by rival producers;68  
• A case challenging alleged discrimination by the publisher of airline 
timetables in its presentation of flight information.69 
The over-extension of the FTC’s 1970s antitrust program was matched 
by an even more astonishing agenda of consumer protection rule-making 
proceedings.70  Among other matters, the FTC “proposed rules that would 
have: imposed disclosures on over-the- counter medicines; required 
inspections, disclosures and warranties on used cars; established definitions 
(like ‘natural’) for foods; regulated mobile home warranties; and banned 
                                                                                                                       
atte3mpted monopolization). 
64 Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 367-68 (1975) (complaint alleging monopolization, 
attempted monopolization, and maintenance of a highly concentrated market structure). 
65 Sunkist Growers, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 443, 445-49 (1981) (complaint alle3ging 
monopolization, attempted monopolization, and maintenance of a noncompetitive market 
structure). 
66 American Medical Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff’d in part, modified in part, 638 
F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d by an equally divided Supreme Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). 
67 Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 1 (1982), enforcement denied, 718 F.2d 
256 (8th Cir. 1983). 
68 Boise Cascade, 91 F.T.C. 1 (1978), enforcement denied,  637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 
1980); Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), enforcement denied, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 
1984) 
69 Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 95 F.T.C. 1 (1976), enforcement denied, 630 F.2d 920 
(2d Cir. 1980). 
70 On the FTC’s consumer protection rulemaking agenda in the 1970s, see William 
MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its Limits in 
Competition Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 951-54 (2005). 
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certain credit practices. . .”71  There were almost thirty major rule-making 
projects in progress during this period – and the then-FTC Chairman 
(Michael Pertschuk) had announced that going forward, rule-making might 
be based on public policy grounds, including to “prohibit businesses from 
hiring illegal aliens, to prevent companies from cheating on taxes, and to 
require companies with repeated environmental violations to place an 
environmental on their Boards.”72  Pertschuk subsequently acknowledged 
that he had presided over a rule-making “frenzy.”73 
Even if one boldly assumes that each ambitious decision by the FTC 
to undertake each of these matters, when seen in isolation, made good 
substantive sense, the full collection completely overwhelmed the FTC’s 
institutional capacity to deliver.  To add new, difficult initiatives to an 
already crowded agenda without accounting for implementation burdens 
was a breathtaking example of administrative malpractice.74  
In fairness, the fault for overextension sometimes lies with 
legislators, who assign new duties to agencies without considering 
capability and capacity.  These new responsibilities only rarely come with 
additional resources attached.  As we have explained in other work, the 
agency then faces the choice of either ignoring selected responsibilities or 
spreading its resources thin in trying to do it all.75  The first strategy is a 
form of regulatory disobedience, and the second is a formula for inevitable 
failures in delivery.   
In reciting the dangers of overextension, we are not suggesting that 
agency leadership should forego consumption, and devote all of their efforts 
to investment.  Consumption, in the form of law enforcement and 
rulemaking, is essential to the work of a good regulatory agency.  The 
willingness to litigate cases and the ability to pursue them to a successful 
end are vital to an agency’s credibility, effectiveness, and legitimacy.  
Litigated cases set the boundaries of lawful behavior.  A regulator that 
                                                
71 Id.   
72 Id., citing Timothy J. Muris & J. Howard Beales, The Limits of Unfairness Under 
the Federal Trade Commmission Act 14 Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers (1991) 
73 MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION 54 (1982)  
74 Kovacic, supra note 34, at 923 (“One could understand a decision to bring one 
innovating and potentially path-breaking shared monopolization case, but it was 
improvident to bring two.  One could imagine a decision to bring one or two predatory 
pricing cases, but it overtaxed the agency’s capacity to do three at once.  To do four 
significant dominance cases at one time might have been manageable.  To do eight was 
unwise.  Incumbent leadership began new matters without asking difficult questions about 
how the agency would bring them to a successful end.”)  See also Kovacic, supra note 15.  
75 Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 10.  Dodd-Frank placed the 
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in precisely this unenviable position.  Id.   
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cannot credibly commit that it will challenge misconduct is quickly 
recognized to be a paper tiger.76  Litigation also provides an indispensable 
means for obtaining remedies for the victims of misconduct.  Rulemaking is 
similarly important as a means to correct problems that pervade entire 
economic sectors, or appear in multiple areas of commerce.  Finally, 
establishing a reputation for courageously taking on hard problems can 
build internal morale and attract high quality talent. 
Simply stated, a sensible scorecard for agency performance must 
consider not just whether cases or rulemaking are launched, but when and 
how they land.77  The issue is not whether agency leadership aims at 
ambitious targets, but is instead the “ability to match means to ends.”78  We 
should harness the personal ambition and zeal of agency leadership in the 
service of effective policy implementation.79 
IV. A Case Study of Balanced Investment and Consumption 
The FTC’s health care portfolio shows the benefits of a balanced 
approach to investment and consumption.  Since the 1970s, the FTC has 
devoted considerable effort to health care, beginning with a major case 
challenging restrictions on advertising in the medical profession,80 and 
going on from there.81  In health care, the FTC has batted through its entire 
rotation of policy tools, including numerous cases, rule-making, advisory 
opinions, hearings, and competition advocacy.82 More than any other 
                                                
76 Of course, litigation does not require actually taking defendants to trial.  As we 
noted in an earlier article, “taking a case to trial and losing doesn’t help the agency’s brand 
– and successful agencies don’t need to take their cases to trial to accomplish their 
regulatory objectives.”  Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 10, at fn 139.  
77 In some instances, the scorecard does include outcomes.  When the website for 
Obamacare (healthcare.gov) failed on launch, no amount of spinning could obscure the 
problem.  The continuing inability of the Veterans Administration to address its waiting 
lists, other than by outright falsification of the data, provides another example of the 
phenomenon.    
78 King & Crewe, supra note 7, at 419. 
79 Schuck, supra note 6, at 129 (“What matters, or should matter, to the citizenry is the 
actual performance of officially administered programs on the ground, yet this performance 
may have little or nothing to do with how publicly-spirited they are.  Indeed, just as speed 
is a bad thing if one is going in the wrong direction, so officials’ zeal may in some 
situations actually exacerbate program failure.”)  
80 American Medical Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), modified and enforced, 638 F.2d 
443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). 
81 John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Federal |Trade Commission and the Professions: A Quarter 
Century of Accomplishment and Some New Challenges, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 997 (2005).   
82 See Jonathan Nuechterlein, How the FTC Works: Lessons from the Commission’s 
Supreme Court Trifecta 3-6 (Mar. 20, 2015) (describing FTC’s reliance on the full 
portfolio of its policy tools in development its modern health care program), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/632081/150320adminlawre
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program, the health care program has paid the rent for the FTC’s charter as 
a competition authority.   
Consider just a few recent accomplishments.  Over the past three 
years, the FTC has achieved victories in three Supreme Court cases 
involving health care.  In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, 
the Supreme Court held that absent active supervision, antitrust scrutiny of 
the actions of a state licensing board dominated by active market 
participants was proper.83  In Phoebe Putney, the Court said that state action 
immunity should be read narrowly, and reiterated the requirement that states 
must clearly articulate their purpose to suppress competition.84 In Actavis, 
the Court said the rule of reason applies to the “reverse payments” in the 
pharmaceutical sector, and rejected a more permissive “scope of the patent” 
test.85   
All three victories were built on a foundation of decades of hard 
work.86  These high-profile cases were part of a larger litigation program 
that has seen the FTC successfully challenge hospital mergers (after more 
than a decade of losses);87 dramatically reduce abuse of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act;88 attack horizontal restraints involving health care providers;89 and 
oppose overreaching forms of occupational licensing and other restrictions 
on competition.90  In addition to these litigation programs, the FTC has 
engaged in a large number of advocacy initiatives, encouraging other 
                                                                                                                       
view.pdf  
83 North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S, Ct, 1101 (2015). 
84 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013).  
85 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
86 Nuechterlein, supra note 82, at 1-2 (“I mention these victories not out of a misplaced 
sense of triumphalism, but because each of the three cases tells a compelling back story 
about what makes the FTC successful as a competition authority.  Each of the three arose 
from a multi-decade FTC initiative focusing on a difficult and discrete area of competition 
policy.  And each of those initiatives was built on a solid foundation of strong bipartisan 
support and close coordination among the FTC’s litigators, economists, and policy 
analysts.”)    
87 Since 2000, the FTC’s merger enforcement program in the hospital sector has 
achieved litigated victories in the courts of appeals in two cases (St. Alphonsus Ctr. – 
Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015) and ProMedica v. 
FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014)), and has resulted in the abandonment of proposed 
mergers in two others.  In another case (Evanston Hospital) the FTC issued an opinion 
finding that a consummated merger had violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act, though the 
remedy ultimately achieved in the case is generally regarded as a disappointment.  These 
accomplishments are reviewed in Nuechterlein, supra note 82, at 6.   
88 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013).  
89 North Texas Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008). 
90 North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015); South 
Carolina State Board of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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government entities to account for the competitive impact of statutes and 
regulations.91 
These successes were not an accident, or the result of dumb luck.  
Instead, the FTC: (a) identified health care as a major priority; (b) invested 
substantial resources to build capability and capacity in the area; and (c) 
conducted periodic ex post evaluations to identify areas of useful 
refinement.92  We briefly address each of these steps below.  
A. Setting Goals and Designing a Strategy to Achieve Them  
Before the 1970s, the FTC was a reactive agency, responding to 
consumer complaints, and trying to “clear the inbox.”  During this period, 
health care was not a major priority for the agency.  Health care became a 
priority because the FTC decided to engage in strategic planning.  The 
strategic planning process was driven by the FTC’s desire to identify areas 
of the economy where it could make a useful and distinctive contribution, 
thereby delivering major benefits to consumers.  Strategic planning made it 
clear that health care was a “target-rich” environment for the FTC. 
Why did the FTC decide to engage in strategic planning, rather than 
allow its workload and priorities to be driven by the inbox of consumer 
complaints?  The FTC adopted strategic planning because of external 
pressure and internal changes.  External commentators and legislators 
demanded improvements, including enhancements in the FTC’s system for 
setting priorities; a focus on difficult and unsettled areas of competition law; 
and attention to problems that could be addressed with the FTC’s unique 
array of policy making instruments.93  Legislators in the early 1970s also 
identified the rising cost of medical services as a worthy subject for the 
FTC’s attention.94  These demands established the framework within which 
the FTC shaped its competition policy agenda.   
                                                
91 On the FTC’s advocacy program, see Andrew I. Gavil & Tara Isa Koslov, A Flexible 
Health Care Workforce Requires a Flexible Regulatory Environment: Promoting 
Competition Through Regulatory Reform, 90 WASH L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016); 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, 100 Is the New 30: Recommendations for the FTC’s Next 100 
Years, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2014) (calling FTC’s competition advocacy 
role a “tool of great importance”); James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of 
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005). 
92 Nuechterlein, supra note 82, at 7 (in targeting health care, “the FTC identified a 
competition policy problem, closely analyzed it over many years with all the investigatory 
tools at its disposal, and brought a series of enforcement actions to protect consumers from 
anticompetitive practices.”)   
93 See Hyman & Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? supra note 5 
(discussing criticism of the FTC by the American Bar Association’s Commission to Study 
the Federal Trade Commission, and by Congress). 
94 Kovacic, supra note 38, at 639-40. 
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The internal changes were less visible, but equally significant.  
During the 1970s, the Commission recruited talented managers and 
supporting personnel to spot potential high-value applications of the 
agency’s competition powers.  Internal analysis and research made it clear 
that a greater dedication of resources to health care would significantly 
improve consumer welfare.95  The combination of these elements caused 
agency leadership to prioritize health care.     
B. Capability and Capacity Enhancements 
Health care promised to be a difficult and risky area of endeavor for 
the FTC.  The FTC was taking on a powerful industry, and intervening in a 
sector of the economy where the use of competition policy was extremely 
controversial.96  Although the FTC went “looking for trouble,” it did so in a 
way that gave it a fighting chance to succeed.   
 
More specifically, the FTC invested heavily in health policy R&D.  
These efforts included influential studies of the impact of advertising 
restrictions on health care products and services;97 a major study of the 
impact of entry by generic producers on the pricing of pharmaceutical 
products;98 and a retrospective examination of the impact of hospital 
mergers.99  These research projects set the foundation for the FTC’s 
enforcement efforts, including the hospital merger litigation program of the 
past decade.100 
The FTC also used hearings, seminars, and workshops to gather 
                                                
95 The authors are grateful to Daniel C. Schwartz for sharing his experiences about the 
design of the FTC’s modern health care program in the 1970s.  Schwartz served as a 
Deputy Director for the FTC’s Bureau of Competition and played a central role in the 
formulation of the new program.  See also Kovacic, supra note 48.  
96 See William E. Kovacic, Measuring What Matters: The Federal Trade Commission 
and Investments in Competition Policy Research and Development, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 861 
(2005).   
97  See Ronald S. Bond et al., Federal Trade Commission Staff Report on Effects of 
Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice in the Professions: The Case of 
Optometry (Bureau of Economics, Sept. 1980), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/effects-restrictions-advertising-
and-commercial-practice-professions-case-optometry/198009optometry.pdf  
98 Federal Trade Commission Staff, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: 
An FTC Study (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.  
99 Orley Ashenfelter et al, Retrospective Analysis of Hospital Mergers, 18 INT’L J. 
ECON. BUS. 5 (2011). 
100 Ronan Harty, Interview with Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, 14 The Threshold 1, 6-7 
(American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, Issue No. 2, Spring 2014); 
Nuechterlein, supra note 82.  
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information.101  Among other results, these proceedings led to the 
publication of formative reports dealing with competition in health care,102 
and the state action doctrine.103  The state action project, in turn, set in 
motion a litigation program from which North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners is the most recent output.  Finally, the FTC and DOJ jointly 
issued guidelines on antitrust relevant behavior in the health care sector.104 
 
C. Retrospective Evaluation 
The two of us have attended hundreds of presentations by 
competition agency officials.  Such presentations invariably include some 
version of the observation, “we’ve been very busy.”  Audiences are 
generally too polite to respond, “have you been very effective?” 
Of course, some level of activity is important for an agency to build 
capability, credibility, and legitimacy.105  However, to treat activity levels 
as the primary or exclusive measure of performance evades the equally 
important issue of effectiveness.  
To decide whether a program actually worked, ex post evaluation is 
necessary.106  Lots of government programs fail.107  An agency that 
routinely conducts ex post evaluation can identify what has worked well 
and what needs to be improved.  Ex post evaluation is a vital quality control 
device, and it should be an automatic feature of the life cycle of 
policymaking.  
Beginning in the late 1970s, the FTC developed a path-breaking 
program to examine the effects of closed competition matters.108 The 
program began with an assessment of a monopolization case and various 
vertical restraints matters.  In the early 2000s, the program was extended to 
hospital mergers.  The hospital merger retrospective sought to determine the 
                                                
101 For example, in 2003, the FTC and DOJ jointly held over 20 days of hearings on 
Competition and Consumer Protection in Health Care.    
102 FTC & Department of Justice, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition 
(2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf  
103 Office of Policy Planning, FTC, Report of the State Action Task Force (Sept. 2003), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf.  
104 On the importance of agency guidelines as policy making tools, see Hillary Greene, 
Agency Character and the Character of Agency Guidelines: An Historical and Institutional 
Perspective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1039 (2005). 
105 William E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies Signal 
Quality, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 247-48 (2015) (discussing importance of sustaining 
a minimum critical mass of activity). 
106 See supra note 87. 
107 See Schuck, supra note 6.  
108 William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of 
Competition Authorities, 31 J. Corp. L. 503 (2006). 
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consequences of various hospital mergers that the FTC had unsuccessfully 
challenged.  The results were vital to the success of a renewed hospital 
merger enforcement program, which began with a case again Evanston 
Hospital in the mid-2000s, and has since resulted in a string of successes.109 
 
V. Striking a Better Balance Between Consumption and 
Investment 
The conflict between consumption and investment may be a policy 
perennial, but it does not follow that there is nothing that can be done to tip 
the balance a bit more in favor of the latter.  Following on Professor James 
Q. Wilson, we propose “a few modest suggestions that may make a small 
difference.”110  These steps do not depend on agency leadership suddenly 
deciding to “do the right thing.”  
A. Create A Pro-Investment Norm 
Our most general suggestion is the promotion of a norm that 
encourages agency leadership to make adequate investments in institutional 
capability.  At conferences and in other public settings, agency leaders are 
invariably asked to discuss the cases they have already launched, and their 
plans for initiating new cases.  Agency leaders are happy to wax poetic on 
such subjects – but we should demand that they do more than brag about 
consumption.  Agency leaders should be cross-examined about the steps 
they are taking to make their agencies better off in the future.  Concrete 
questions might include: 
• What investments are you making to enhance the capability of 
your agency?  
• What are you doing to build your agency’s knowledge about the 
commercial settings that it regulates?  
• How many resources are you spending to build better networks 
with your fellow regulatory institutions, both at home and 
abroad?   
• What steps are you taking to evaluate the results of past 
interventions?   
• How should we measure your success in these areas? 
If agency leadership knows they will have to answer these questions, 
                                                
109 Id. at 524-26; Nuechterlein, supra note 82, at 4-5. 
110 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY 
THEY DO IT 369 (1989).   
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they will have an incentive to proactively address (and defend) the balance 
they have struck between consumption and investment. 
B. Investment Budgets  
Currently, agencies publicly report (and trumpet the successes of) 
their enforcement efforts, but their investment efforts are invisible.  To 
redress this disparity, each agency should have to annually report its 
investments in capability and capacity, and explain how these investments 
will support the agency’s anticipated substantive programs.  Just as a public 
company reports its R&D budget to potential investors and analysts, each 
agency should specify its policy R&D budget.  Of course, we do not believe 
that each agency should spend a fixed percentage of its overall budget on 
policy R&D, nor do we believe that every dollar of policy R&D investment 
is of equal value.  And, we anticipate no shortage of efforts to “game” the 
reporting requirements, by reporting inflated investments in policy R&D.  
Still, the process of preparing an investment budget should force agency 
personnel to examine whether they are doing enough to set a sound 
foundation for the future. 
C. Setting Priorities and Approving Projects 
We have both been in academics long enough to see serial rounds of 
strategic planning by our respective institutions.  The process involves an 
endless series of meetings, culminating in the creation of meaningless 
mission statements, backed up by hundreds of pages of boilerplate.  Lather, 
rinse, repeat.   
We are hesitant to recommend anything that would force others to 
go through the same process.  But, agencies will either set their own 
priorities, or they will be set for them by outsiders.  Since agency leadership 
values autonomy, they should be willing to take steps that lower the 
likelihood outsiders will seize control of the policy agenda.  Accordingly, 
agencies should annually identify and publicize their priorities.  As with the 
investment budget, the process may encourage agency personnel (and 
outsiders) to consider what the agency is doing – and whether it is worth 
continuing down the same path.   
The agency’s process for project approval should involve a similar 
set of calculations.  Unless the agency has a systematic process for deciding 
whether to initiate a new investigation, case, or rule-making project, there 
will be little predictability or rationality in the results.  And saying “this is 
the Chairman’s pet project” is not a sufficient reason for committing public 
resources to a project, when the Chairman will not be around to bear the 
consequences of that decision.  Before green-lighting a project, agencies 
should be able to answer the following questions: 
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• What do we expect to gain if the project succeeds – doctrinal 
results, economic impact, enhancement of institutional 
reputation and capability? 
• What are the risks – doctrinal barriers, political backlash that the 
project will arouse, reputational costs if the project fails? 
• Who will do the project – is the team to which the project will be 
assigned equal to the task? 
• How much will it cost, and what projects must we forego if this 
one goes ahead? 
• How does the project fit within our existing portfolio of existing 
commitments? 
• How long will it take to accomplish? 
• How will we know whether it worked as we hoped?111 
Of course, there will often be difficulty in giving confident answers to 
these questions, and genuine uncertainty has accompanied many a 
successful project.  But, a rigorous effort to answer these questions 
increases ones’ confidence that the agency has the means to deliver, and is 
not engaged in a snipe/snark/shark hunt.112   
D. Ex Post Evaluation.   
As described above, a routine program of ex post evaluation 
provides a valuable feedback mechanism that will allow the agency to 
assess whether it has properly matched commitments with capabilities.  In 
comparing expectations ex ante to outcomes ex post, the agency should 
obtain a better sense of how to structure future projects, and how to increase 
the prospects for future success.  A habit of ex post review also deters 
incumbent leaders from launching new projects without considering 
potential long-term negative externalities.113 
                                                
111 This framework is inspired by the prioritization principles adopted by the United 
Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading and continued by its successor, the Competition and 
Markets Authority. Kovacic, supra note 12, at 8-10; Kovacic, supra note 15.  
112 A snipe hunt is an impossible task.  A snark hunt can end very badly for those 
involved if the snark turns out to be a Boojum.  Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark 
(1876).  And, a shark hunt may require a bigger boat.  See Jaws (1975).  
113 See King & Crewe, supra note 7, at 358. (“There would be a lot to be said for 
encouraging – and if necessary, permitting – both the National Audit Office and the select 
committees of the House of Commons to assess how well government initiatives were 
continuing to achieve their declared purposes after, say, five, ten or twenty years. . . Those 
bodies might even be encouraged to identify and then either to applaud or to chastise those 
ministers who had been principally responsible for launching the initiatives in the first 
place.  The thought of possibly being publicly chastised several years later, but still well 
within their own lifetime, might – who knows? – give over-hasty and overambitious 
ministers pause.  It might even cause them to ask, before or at the moment of decision, 
19-Dec-15] What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize? 25 
  
VI. A Few Complications 
A. Striking the Proper Balance 
Although we have been quite critical of consumption, we are not 
suggesting that all consumption is bad.  Similarly, although we have praised 
investment, we are not claiming that all investment is good.  The key is to 
strike the proper balance between these two priorities.  To date, the balance 
has been systematically skewed in favor of consumption.  We will not be 
able to fix that problem until it is recognized as a problem.  After that, we 
will have to create the necessary incentives for agency leadership to “do the 
right thing.”  That approach is far more likely to lead to good results than 
any of the alternative strategies; as one of us noted in an earlier article: 
[I]f you get the incentives right, most of the big problems 
will take care of themselves, leaving a far smaller and more 
tractable set of problems to be addressed through regulation, 
litigation, and benign neglect.  But, if you do not get the 
incentives right, no amount of speeches, op-eds, law review 
articles, whining and hectoring, moral preening, regulatory 
oversight, legislation, lawsuits, or lectures about fairness and 
justice can take their place. Reformers should accordingly 
focus on getting the incentives right — and legislation that 
does not address the underlying incentive problem is not, in 
fact, “reform,” no matter what else it may accomplish.114 
B. Does it Matter Whether Agency Leadership is a Plank Owner or 
a Successor-in-Interest? 
Departments, agencies, bureaus and commissions are periodically 
created from scratch, but most agency leaders inherit the job from someone 
else.   The first agency leader is the equivalent of a plank-owner, with 
tremendous power to shape the nature of the agency, its personnel, and its 
priorities.115  Subsequent leaders are successors-in-interest, who step into 
the shoes of their predecessors.  As such, they have more limited ability to 
re-shape the agency in their image.  That said, if prior leadership has made 
good investment decisions, the agency will be in better shape – and better 
able to withstand the effects of excessive consumption by the latest agency 
                                                                                                                       
“How will that look in ten years’ time?”) 
114 David A. Hyman, Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like 
Everywhere Else, 36 AM. J. LAW & MED. 370 (2010) 
115 U.S. Navy, Plank Owners, available at 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=180 (“A ‘plank owner’ is an individual 
who was a member of the crew of a ship when that ship was placed in commission.”) 
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head.    But, regardless of whether the agency head is a plank owner or a 
successor-in-interest, they will each end up making a regular series of 
consumption v. investment decisions – and it it those decisions with which 
we are concerned.  Thus, we do not distinguish between whether agency 
leadership is a plank owner or a successor-in-interest.   
C. Agency Leadership v. Agency Personnel 
We have presented a stylized example of a governmental agency, in 
which agency leadership always (or almost always) gets their way.  That is 
obviously an over-simplification.  Agency leadership may be short-term, 
but most agencies are full of “WeBes,” who have their own perspective and 
priorities.116  The key question – to which the answer is likely to be agency- 
and leader-specific – is whether agency leadership must consult with the 
WeBes about consumption v. investment decisions – and who gets the last 
word on the subject.  As always, attention to institutional detail is critical 
before drawing definitive conclusions.117    
D. Operationalizing the Framework 
In the abstract, investment is hard to argue with.  Everyone knows the 
story of the ant and the grasshopper – and the moral (“to work today is to 
eat tomorrow”) is hard to argue with.  But, “invest more” is spectacularly 
unhelpful advice.  “Build capability and capacity” is sufficiently vague and 
open-ended that almost anything might qualify.  Similarly, “consume less” 
means that the agency will not be as visible – making it a less credible (and 
less faithful) enforcer of its statutory mandate.  There are political perils 
with consuming too aggressively – but there are perils with withdrawing 
from the field, and leaving it unregulated.  Finally, people strive to become 
agency leaders because they want to advance the goals of that agency – and 
bringing cases and initiating rule-making is one of the few ways of doing 
just that. Investing in capability and capacity doesn’t result in favorable 
press coverage for a good reason – it is boring, and often unproductive.  
And, some forms of consumption actually constitute investment, because 
they allow the agency to train its personnel – and create the precedents the 
agency can then rely on to advance its objectives on a broader plane.118   
                                                
116 Michael Grunwald, Too Good For Government, Time, Aug 30, 2012, at 
http://business.time.com/2012/08/30/too-good-for-government/  (describing travails of an 
agency head who tried to transform her agency by devising “a secret Operation Cupcake to 
try to fire the laggards, but the civil-service cupcakes knew political appointees come and 
go.  They called themselves WeBes, as in We be here, you be gone.”) 
117 See Schuck, supra note 6; Wilson, supra note 110. 
118 For example, the FTC’s prosecution of a case involving concerted refusal to deal by 
dentists in Indiana helped lay the foundation for modern jurisprudence on the rule of 
reason.  See Kovacic, supra note 36 (“Consider the FTC’s case in Indiana Federation of 
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We agree with these points – but the problem of excessive consumption 
is sufficiently pervasive that it demands our attention.  Simply stated, we 
are not opposed to the building of skyscrapers by agency leaders with an 
edifice complex – we just want to ensure that those skyscrapers are built on 
a solid foundation.   
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
Public agency leadership faces a recurring choice between 
consumption and investment.  Several factors encourage agency leadership 
to favor consumption over investment.  Predictably enough, this dynamic 
creates serious problems, including a mismatch between agency 
commitments (made in time t0) and the agency’s (in)ability to deliver good 
results (which does not become apparent until time tn). 
In this essay, we make the case that greater attention should be paid 
to whether agency leadership is investing, rather than consuming.  
Investment is the foundation for an effective enforcement agency – and we 
should start treating it as such.  If we want agency leadership to plant trees, 
we need to make it in their interest to do so.  Otherwise, instead of behaving 
like Johnny Appleseed, agency leaders will continue to follow the Sirens of 
consumption.   
                                                                                                                       
Dentists (IFD).  An index of importance that focused on the total volume of commerce 
affected probably would not give much weight to a challenge to a concerted refusal by 
dentists in Indiana to provide the x-rays of their patients to insurers. In that sense, IFD is a 
comparatively insignificant matter—a small case. Evaluated by its effect on doctrine, the 
small case made big law. The Supreme Court’s decision in IFD helped shape modern 
jurisprudence governing the rule of reason and the proof of anticompetitive effects.  
Among other results, IFD provided a doctrinal foundation for the Justice Department’s 
prosecution of Microsoft.”)  
   
